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L’objectif visé dans cet article est de contri-
buer à une meilleure compréhension de la 
notion de diversité culturelle telle qu’elle 
a été développée dans les relations exté-
rieures de l’Union européenne (UE). Nous 
y adoptons ainsi une conception  conforme 
à la définition large de la diversité cultu-
relle qui a été adoptée par la Convention 
sur la protection et la promotion de la di-
versité des expressions culturelles (ci-après, 
Convention UNESCO).L’ article suppose 
que le concept de diversité culturelle touche 
à la fois des intérêts économiques et des 
sphères socioculturelles capables d’influen-
cer la vie des individus. En s’appuyant sur 
une  approche de droit  qui met l’accent 
sur le cadre sociopolitique dans lequel le 
concept a pris forme, nous tentons  d’ana-
lyser comment la diversité culturelle est 
élaborée dans les relations commerciales 
internationales. Cette analyse vise à expli-
quer comment la diversité culturelle a été 
abordée par l’Accord économique et com-
mercial global (AECG) entre le Canada et 
l’UE. Les questions culturelles ont en effet 
This article contributes to further unders-
tanding the meaning of ‘cultural diversity’ 
as it has developed in the external relations 
of the European Union (EU). The notion of 
cultural diversity described here adheres to 
the definition adopted by the Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Di-
versity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 
Convention). This article assumes that the 
concept of cultural diversity touches upon 
both economic interests and socio-cultural 
spheres that have an influence on people’s 
lives. Using an approach that analyses the 
law in context, emphasizing the socio-po-
litical framework in which this concept has 
taken shape, this article explores how cultu-
ral diversity is depicted in international 
trade relations. This analysis aims at explai-
ning how cultural diversity was addressed 
in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and 
Canada. During these negotiations, cultu-
ral issues have, in fact, been among some 
of the most debated topics. Canada and the 
EU share similar, but not identical, unders-
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été parmi les sujets les plus débattus pen-
dant les  négociations de l’AECG. Si dans 
le cadre des relations commerciales inter-
nationales, le Canada et l’UE partagent  de 
la diversité culturelle, des visions  assez 
proches, celles-ci ne sont pas pour autant 
identiques. Le présent article dévoile  les 
visions européenne et canadienne,  analyse 
le développement de la notion de diversité 
culturelle dans  des contextes plus vastes où 
le concept a pris forme ainsi que  les intérêts 
antagonistes qui y sont débattus. . Il exa-
mine comment la notion de diversité cultu-
relle a été dépeinte dans les négociations 
de l’Organisation Mondial du Commerce 
(OMC) portant sur les services audiovi-
suels et comment la Convention UNES-
CO a contribué à son développement. Une 
analyse du cas Chine-Publications et pro-
duits audiovisuels réglé par l’Organe de 
règlement des différends (ORD) de l’OMC 
offre un aperçu de la façon dont le cadre ju-
ridique et politique complexe des relations 
extérieures de l’UE a un impact sur le rôle 
exercé par l’Union européenne dans la pro-
tection et la promotion de la diversité cultu-
relle. Enfin, cet article apporte de nouvelles 
considérations sur la façon dont la notion 
de diversité culturelle a été influencée par 
l’AECG et présente quelques remarques sur 
l’impact que cet accord pourrait avoir sur 
l’efficacité de cette notion. Il apporte aussi 
des considérations sur la façon dont cette 
notion pourrait être influencée par le Par-
tenariat transatlantique de commerce et 
d’investissement (PTCI), tout en esquissant 
une réflexion sur le concept de protection-
nisme.
tanding of the concept of cultural diversity 
in international trade. In order to disclose 
their different positions, this article ana-
lyses the development of cultural diversity 
within the broader contexts in which this 
notion has taken shape and the conflicting 
interests involved in its negotiation, pro-
motion and protection. This article exa-
mines how the notion of cultural diversity 
has been portrayed within World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) negotiations on audio-
visual services and the contribution of the 
UNESCO Convention to its development. 
An analysis of the 2009 China-Publications 
and AV Products case settled by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body offers insight 
into how the complex legal and political 
framework of the EU’s external relations 
impacts its role in protecting and promo-
ting cultural diversity. Finally, this paper 
contributes new observations about how 
CETA has influenced understandings of 
cultural diversity and offers a few conclu-
sions about the impact that this agreement 
may have on its effectiveness as a concept. 
It also includes considerations on how this 
notion may be shaped by the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
and reflections on the concept of protectio-
nism.
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diver-
sity of Cultural Expressions (hereinafter: the “UNESCO Convention”)1 provides a 
broad definition of cultural diversity that does not impose any discernible limit to 
the scope of its application. In this article, I also adhere to this “open” definition, 
which includes an interpretation of culture both as artistic expression and as an 
expression of customs and traditions. According to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the 
UNESCO Convention, “‘Cultural diversity’ refers to the manifold ways in which 
the cultures of groups and societies find expression. These expressions are passed 
on within and among groups and societies [paragraph 1]. Cultural diversity is made 
manifest not only through the varied ways in which the cultural heritage of hu-
manity is expressed, augmented and transmitted through the variety of cultural 
expressions, but also through diverse modes of artistic creation, production, dis-
semination, distribution and enjoyment, whatever the means and technologies used 
[paragraph 2].” 
In order to contribute to further understandings about approaches to cultural 
diversity adopted by CETA, I will examine its development within the WTO nego-
tiations and show that, internationally, cultural diversity as a concept became more 
solidified through the UNESCO Convention. I will also try to depict, through an 
analysis of the 2009 China-Publications and AV Products WTO case, how the com-
plex legal and political framework of the EU’s external relations has an influence on 
its role in protecting and promoting cultural diversity.  
In international trade negotiations, the notion of “cultural diversity” has been 
informed by a protectionist approach aimed at limiting the power of transnational 
oligopolies and monopolies that tend to reshape cultural industries and expressions 
on a global scale. This protectionism mainly addresses the concerns of states and 
regional economic organisations like the European Union (hereinafter: the “EU”) 
to support local economies and limit global cultural homogenization, thus reinforc-
ing the conditions for the development and conservation of cultural pluralism. For 
example, with specific regard to the film industry, the notion of cultural diversity 
reflects the aim of supporting cinematographic production through state aid. One 
can argue that this aid has “a double nature: it is both cultural and economic, as it 
supports both an artistic expression and a historically fragile industry. This distinc-
tion [which can be applied to all cultural industries] is actually factious, because 
the only way to really support a film as a cultural expression is by fostering the un-
1. English text available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf> (ac-
cessed October 12th, 2015) 
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derlying industry,”2 but is of crucial importance since it shapes international trade 
negotiations.3 
The EU’s terminology, developed for the purpose of external relations, confi-
gured the notion of cultural diversity during the international negotiations on trade 
in services, and particularly audiovisual4 services that were held within the World 
Trade Organization (hereinafter: the “WTO”).5 Negotiating the international regu-
lation of these services also means negotiating the socio-cultural dimensions, which 
include both “values” and beliefs that touch people’s daily lives. This is because such 
dimensions directly affect the realities individuals inhabit and the way in which 
these realities are both organized and constructed. 
Because of the complexity of these issues, the negotiations on trade in services 
are very difficult to conclude. WTO Members did not find a balance between libera-
lizing cultural markets to acquire economic benefits and protecting local differences 
to avoid cultural homogenization. Even though these negotiations have currently 
been suspended, they are still at the root of the notion of cultural diversity as deve-
loped in international trade relations; therefore, they are still crucial to its unders-
tanding. 
The difficulties related to the multilateral framework of the WTO created a strong 
incentive for its Members to turn towards bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
Therefore, issues involving the protection and promotion of cultural diversity have 
been, and will increasingly be, negotiated within FTAs. These agreements have pri-
marily adopted the so-called “negative list approach,” as in the case of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter: “NAFTA”) concluded between Ca-
nada, Mexico and the United States (hereinafter: the “US”). This approach implies 
that the agreement covers all service sectors and measures except for those expressly 
mentioned in a list of reservations: discriminatory measures affecting all included 
sectors are liberalized unless specific measures are set out in the FTA. It also re-
quires states to establish a definitive list of restrictions, thus preventing them from 
gradually opening their markets. This approach differs from the so-called “positive 
list approach,” according to which the sectors that a Party to the FTA wants to libe-
ralize will be listed in a schedule of commitments: only those which are explicitly 
mentioned are liberalized. This “positive list approach” has shaped the EU tradition 
and methodology in international trade negotiations, thus determining the ways in 
2. Lucia Bellucci, “National Support for Film Production in the EU: An Analysis of the Commis-
sion Decision-Making Practice”, (2010) 16-2 European Law Journal 211. 
3. Id., 211-212. It also shapes the EU competition policy, in particular the Commission deci-
sion-making practice.
4. Following the Commission’s interpretation of the term “audiovisual,” my contribution under-
stands this term in its broadest sense, and includes both cinema and television. 
5. Cf Christopher Arup, The New World Trade Organization Agreements. Globalizing Law Through 
Services and Intellectual Property, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 97. 
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which cultural diversity and expression have been protected and promoted within 
an international context. 
In economic terms, the most relevant FTAs for the EU are the Comprehen-
sive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which was concluded between the 
EU and Canada, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
which the EU is currently negotiating with the US. CETA concerns two politically 
and economically “developed” international actors that share very similar views on 
issues related to cultural diversity, whereas TTIP involves two commercial partners 
that have markedly different positions on these issues.
The concept of cultural diversity in the external relations of the European Union 
also involves the ties it maintains with a particular kind of partner – of which China 
is the most prominent – that on the one hand, according to its generation of wealth, 
can be classified among developed countries, while on the other hand, according 
to the distribution of this wealth, is still considered a developing country. In the 
negotiations between these partners, the EU is confronted with different and com-
peting interests that affect its position with regard to the protection and promotion 
of cultural diversity. For example, some Member States’ interests in protecting their 
film industries are in direct conflict with other Member States’ interests in liberali-
zing markets to ease restrictions in the music industry’s export sector.
In addition, to enable the European Commission (hereinafter: the “Commis-
sion”) to negotiate for the EU on culturally sensitive issues, the EU Member States 
need to find ways to work toward compromise between their disparate cultural po-
licies. It is therefore necessary for the Commission to find middle ground between 
different and competing economic interests but also between the distinct social va-
lues they advocate. The results of this mediation process may vary for political and 
economic reasons. These considerations support the argument of my work, which 
concludes that in international trade negotiations, the EU protects and promotes 
cultural diversity; however, it is frequently confronted with conflicting interests 
which limit the scope of its action. 
It is therefore crucial, in the following discussion, to address how the notion of 
cultural diversity has developed in the EU’s external relations and the countries with 
which the EU negotiates on cultural matters. In the next sections, I take an approach 
that addresses the law in context and acknowledges the socio-political framework in 
which the notion of cultural diversity has taken shape. 
Section 2 discusses the conceptual premises of cultural diversity and their de-
velopment within the WTO trade negotiations. Section 3 focuses on the UNESCO 
Convention, which internationally recognizes this concept through a legally-bind-
ing instrument. Section 4 discloses the contradictions related to the EU’s protection 
and promotion of cultural diversity, through a study of the 2009 China-Publications 
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and AV Products case.6 Section 5 considers issues related to cultural diversity as 
regulated in the CETA. Section 6 focuses on the TTIP negotiations and the notion 
of protection. It also considers this notion in light of developing countries’ peculiar 
needs. Section 7 concludes the analysis.  
1. “Cultural Exception,” “Cultural Specificity” and 
“Cultural Diversity” in WTO Negotiations
To properly analyze the nature and scope of negotiations on audiovisual services, 
one needs to take a step back and consider those conducted within the framework 
of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994)7, which is the round that led to the establish-
ment of the WTO through the Marrakech Agreement of April 15th, 1994. 
During these negotiations, some countries, including France,8 Canada and Aus-
tralia, supported the idea of a “cultural exception”9 or, in other words, that the au-
diovisual sector should be excluded from the scope of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (hereinafter: “GATS”). They had as an inspirational model the 
original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade10 (hereinafter: “GATT 1947”), 
which provides, in Article IV, for a specific exception for cinematographic films, 
and, in Article XX letter f), for an exception that protects national treasures of artis-
tic, historic or archaeological value.11 
The concept of “cultural exception” aimed at excluding cultural services from the 
liberalization process thus highlighting their significance for the system of values 
6. WTO, Panel Report, China − Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R, 12 August 2009, 
available at: <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds363_e.htm> (accessed 12 Oc-
tober 2015); WTO Appellate Body Report, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 2009, available at: 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/363abr_e.pdf » (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
7. Sir Leon Brittan, who was responsible for the Commission’s negotiations, defined the Uruguay 
Round as an exercise without precedent in the process of international economic regulation. 
Leon Brittan, “Guest Editorial: Uruguay Round”, (1994) 31-2 Common Market Law Review 
229.
8. France is the country with the biggest film production industry in Europe and also the broadest 
support system for film. It is therefore the most engaged in monitoring legal and political issues 
that have a potential influence on the audiovisual sector.
9. For two different positions on cultural exception, see Serge Regourd, “L’audiovisuel et le GATT: 
pour un questionnement juridique de l’‘exception culturelle’”, (1993) 106-II Légipresse 101 and 
Laurent Benzoni, “Entre exception culturelle et culture de l’exception”, (2001) 124 Revue de la 
Concurrence et de la Consommation 10. 
10. The provisions of GATT 1947 were incorporated into the GATT 1994, which is a component of 
the Agreement establishing the WTO (Annex 1A).
11. Cf on the topic Aude Tinel, “Qu’est-ce que l’exception culturelle?”, (2000) 435 Revue du Marché 
Commun et de l’Union Européenne 78, 80.
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and the identity of a society, and therefore the need to protect them from a com-
mercial logic.12 The idea of granting the cultural sphere the privilege of protection in 
trade agreements stood in full opposition to that advocated by the US, for example, 
whose negotiators argued that cultural services should be considered as any other 
services and, therefore, liberalized. 
The Commission, which took charge of the negotiations for the then EC, was not 
bound by a negotiating mandate13 to abide by the idea of “cultural exception,” and 
it privileged a new concept: that of “cultural specificity.”14 According to this notion, 
audiovisual services should fall within the scope of GATS, but be subject to a spe-
cific legal regime.15
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Parties failed to reach an agreement 
on audiovisual services, which have therefore been integrated into GATS without 
a specific legal regime. Neither the notion of “cultural exception,” nor that of “cul-
tural specificity,” was legally recognized in the WTO agreements. Even though the 
Commission rejected the concept of “cultural exception,” it acknowledged the need 
to protect audiovisual services within WTO negotiations. To address the matter, the 
Commission presented a list of exemptions to the most favoured nation principle16 
12. Lucia Bellucci, Cinema e aiuti di Stato nell’integrazione europea. Un diritto promozionale in 
Italia e in Francia, Milano, Giuffrè, 2006, p. 311 and Milagros del Corral (ed), Culture, Trade 
and Globalisation: Questions and Answers, Paris, UNESCO, 2000, pp. 35-38, available at: <http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/ 0012/001213/121360e.pdf> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
13. The Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate agreements on behalf of the European 
Community, as stated in the Declaration of Punta del Este of 20 September 1986 pursuant to 
former Art 228 (now Art 300) of the EC Treaty. This mandate, however, was not fully complied 
with, because the Council did not adopt directives. The negotiations have in fact been conduct-
ed within the framework of the Council Decision, adopted on September 20 in Punta del Este, 
which gave the Commission a very generic mandate. This could have been intended to demon-
strate the Council’s willingness to give the Commission a large degree of flexibility or is perhaps 
the result of its inability to provide precise negotiation criteria. See Catherine Schmitter, “La 
Communauté européenne et l’Uruguay Round: incertitudes et faiblesses”, (June 1994), chro-
nique 5 Europe 1, 4.
14. The European Parliament (hereinafter: the “Parliament”) embraced this notion in a resolution 
of July 1993 but in another resolution, adopted in September of the same year, it rejected it in 
favour of “cultural exception.” Cf Serge Regourd, L’exception culturelle, Paris, Presses Universi-
taires de France, 2002, pp. 78-79.
15. Cf Anna Herold, “European Public Film Support within the WTO Framework”, (2003) 6 IRIS 
plus 2, 6.
16. It aims at avoiding the application of a different treatment depending on the origin or the sup-
plier of a service for an equivalent service. Countries cannot discriminate between their trading 
partners. All signatory states must apply this treatment to one another. Article II para 1 GATS 
constitutes a general obligation. It states that: “With respect to any measure covered by this 
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services 
and service suppliers of any other country”.
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under Article II GATS17 and the Annex on Article II Exemptions.18 Furthermore, 
with regard to the national treatment principle under Article XVII GATS,19 the EU 
did not make any liberalisation commitments. 
In the latest round of negotiations, launched under Article XIX GATS in Novem-
ber 2001 at the Ministerial Conference in Doha, the EU did not change its policy on 
audiovisual services but adopted the notion of “cultural diversity.” 
This transition from the notion of “cultural specificity” to that of “cultural diver-
sity” occurred in the mandate given by the Council of the European Union (here-
inafter: the “Council”) to the Commission20 at the occasion of the General Affairs 
Council meeting of October 26th, 1999, and was supported by the Commission and 
the Parliament.21 In its mandate the Council declared that, in future negotiations 
17. Cf Additional Own-Initiative Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Effects of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements [1994] OJ C393/200, para 8.2.
18. See on the topic Paolo Mengozzi, “Le GATS: un accord sans importance pour la Commu-
nauté européenne?”, (1997) 2 Revue du marché unique européen 19, 23-24; Giorgio Sacerdoti, 
L’Accordo generale sugli scambi di servizi (GATS): dal quadro OMC all’attuazione interna in G. 
Sacerdoti & G. Venturini (eds), La liberalizzazione multilaterale dei servizi e i suoi riflessi per 
l’Italia, Milan,  Giuffrè, 1997, p. 7; Francis Snyder, International Trade and Customs Law of the 
European Union London, Butterworths, 1998, p. 444, note 19.
19. According to which “[…] each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less fa-
vourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers” (para 1). This prin-
ciple aims to avoid discrimination between foreigners and nationals. It guarantees that foreign 
services and service providers, specifically those of another Member of the trade agreement, 
are treated no less favourably than local services and service providers. The national treatment 
principle applies only in respect to the services expressly listed by Members in the schedules of 
commitments and the extent to which they may be provided individually on the various modes 
of supply [Gabriella Venturini (with the collaborative work of G. Adinolfi, C. Dordi & A. 
Lupone), L’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, p. 102], that is only 
pertaining to states that have taken liberalisation commitments with regard to certain services. 
Cf Sacerdoti, prec. note 18, p. 9.
20. The Council’s mandate made explicit reference to cultural diversity, in particular in its conclu-
sions. Consultation sur les négociations GATS 2000/OMC portant sur certains services audiovi-
suels (musique et logiciel de loisirs), ainsi que sur les services culturels, available at: <http://europa.
eu.int/comm/avpolicy/ extern/gats2000/ncon_fr.htm> (accessed December 5th, 2006)
21. Pascal Lamy, Les négociations sur le commerce des services à l’OMC, Parlement européen, Stras-
bourg,10 March 2003, p. 3, available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/
speeches_articles/sp1a 158_fr.htm> (accessed December 5th, 2006); Viviane Reding, La diversité 
culturelle, Parlement européen (March 10th, 2003), available at: <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/
cgi/guesten.ks> (accessed 12 October 2015). The Commission stated that the community ap-
proach aims to protect and promote cultural diversity. Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions: Principles and Guidelines for the Community Audiovisual Policy in the Digital 
Age (14 September 1999) COM(1999) 657 final, para 7. With regard to important consultation 
exercises on cultural diversity that involved the Commission in view of the negotiations, see 
Joseph Andrew McMahon, Preserving and Promoting Differences? The External Dimension of 
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within the WTO, the Community (hereinafter: the “Community”) would ensure, as 
it did during the Uruguay Round, that both the Community and its Member States 
would have the opportunity to define and implement cultural and audiovisual poli-
cies respectful of their own cultural diversity.22 
The EU’s decision to give priority to the latter notion, “cultural diversity,” rather 
than to the concepts of “cultural specificity” or “cultural exception,” is primarily mo-
tivated by the need to reconcile differing conceptions of public intervention in the 
sphere of culture held by Member States, and therefore to preserve a unified voice 
for these states during international trade negotiations. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, for example, the interest of some Member States in supporting cinema-
tography and therefore in protecting cultural services has been in conflict with the 
music industry’s interest in having open markets to export their products. Whereas 
the United Kingdom (hereinafter: the “UK”) has a music industry that can easily 
compete on a global scale and therefore aims to develop its export sector by taking 
advantage of open markets, France has an important cinematographic industry that 
cannot compete with the Hollywood oligopolies without state aid, and its industry 
would be endangered by market liberalization in the audiovisual sector. Since both 
countries aim to boost their strongest cultural industry, they respectively tend to 
support and oppose liberalization policies. Through the notion of cultural diversity, 
the EU fostered a commonality of views among its Member States so as to allow ne-
gotiations. The notion of cultural diversity did not pose a threat to Member States’ 
different traditions in supporting cultural industries and expressions, and their di-
verging economic interests, but it helped to overcome them for the sake of being able 
to conduct and conclude negotiations successfully. Arguably, the notion of cultural 
diversity has also been fostered by the desire to satisfy the need for cultural plural-
ity, rather than that of cultural defence.23 Although expressions are mainly “verbal 
stratagems,”24 this notion seems to lie more on a proactive than on a defensive plan.
Cultural Cooperation in R. Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union Law, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 345. The Parliament has expressed its awareness of the special 
role that the European audiovisual sector plays in the defence of cultural pluralism, a healthy 
economy and freedom of expression. Cf European Parliament resolution on the communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU approach 
to the WTO Millennium Round (COM(1999) 331 - C5-0155/1999 - 1999/2149(COS)) [2000] 
OJ C 189/213, paras 24-26; European Parliament Resolution on the Fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference [2002] OJ C 112 E/321, paras 21-22; European Parliament resolution on the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) within the WTO, including cultural diversity, 12 March 
2003 [2004] OJ C 61 E/289, paras 12-13. 
22. Council resolution of 21 February 2001 national aid to the film and audiovisual industries [2001] 
OJ C73/3, para 5; Council resolution of 21 January 2002 on the development of the audiovisual 
sector [2002] OJ C32/4, para 5. 
23. Lawrence Rosen, “The Integrity of Cultures”, (1991) 34:5 American Behavioral Scientist 603.
24. T. Weir, Economic Torts, Clarendon Law Lectures, Oxford, 1997, (Lecture Three: Views from 
Abroad), cited by Horatia Muir Watt, “La fonction subversive du droit comparé”, (2000) 3 Re-
vue internationale de droit comparé 522.
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2. The Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
While the notion of “cultural diversity” had become a more solid concept as part 
of the EU’s external relations, at the international level states such as France and 
Canada, as well as the United Nations Organization for Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (hereinafter: “UNESCO”), were conducting a significant 
campaign aimed at obtaining the formal recognition of cultural diversity by means 
of a legally-binding text. The notion had already been acknowledged in several nor-
mative texts, but it had never been recognized by an international convention. A 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity25 had been adopted by the Council of Europe in 
the name of a commitment to freedom and pluralism of the media, while Article 
22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union26 provides that the 
Union shall respect cultural diversity. 
Internationally, the Forum on Globalisation and Cultural Diversity of 2000, 
which was held in Valencia27 under UNESCO’s patronage and with the Commis-
sion’s support, led to the Valencia Declaration on Globalisation and Cultural Diver-
sity. Even resolution n. 57/249, Culture and development, adopted28 by the United 
Nations General Assembly on December 20th, 2002,29 gave ample space to cultural 
diversity. Furthermore, on  November 2nd, 2001, the 31st section of the UNESCO 
General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (he-
reinafter: “UNESCO Declaration”),30 which recognizes cultural diversity as “the 
common heritage of humanity”31, as well as the “specificity of cultural goods and 
services [compared to other] commodities or consumer goods.”32 
Nevertheless, a legally binding text was still missing at the international level and 
remained so until October 20th, 2005, when the UNESCO Convention was adopted 
by the 33rd session of the UNESCO General Conference.. There are 133 states that 
are Parties to the Convention. Today, the EU, which joined in 2006,33 remains the 
only regional economic integration organisation to be party to this convention.. 
25. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration on Cultural Diversity, December 7th, 
2000, available at: <http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=389843> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
26. In [2000] OJ C364/1.  
27. From May 22-24th, 2000.
28. During the 78th Plenary Session. 
29. A/RES/57/249, available at: <www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/ imag-
es/Res%2057% 20249_01.pdf> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
30. Accompanied by an Action Plan.
31.  Art 1.
32. Art 8.
33. Council decision of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Convention on the Protection and 
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As mentioned in the introduction, the UNESCO Convention identifies cultural 
diversity as a positive response to the trend toward cultural homogenization, and 
concerns culture both as an artistic expression and as an expression of traditions and 
customs.34 The humus in which the UNESCO Convention sank most of its roots was 
that of the international negotiations on audiovisual services. This convention was 
primarily born by the will of some countries to have at their disposal a legally bin-
ding text that would enable them to protect and promote their national cultural wel-
fare. In other words, to adopt protectionist policies that support domestic cultural 
production, thus maintaining and developing not only a national industry, but also 
a certain cultural diversity on offer and therefore a variety of choices for the public.
The UNESCO Convention treats the principle of sovereignty (Article 2, para-
graph 2) as one of its fundamental principles. Both the protection and promotion 
of cultural diversity revolve around states that have “the sovereign right to adopt 
measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions 
within their territory,”35 including measures to support cultural industries and pro-
mote the diversity of media,36 that encompasses public service broadcasters.37 The-
refore, the UNESCO Convention legitimizes state aid to audiovisual works, which 
has been at the core of the conflicts on cultural issues between WTO Members. 
Even though the UNESCO Convention is vague in many ways, and displays some 
arguable weaknesses,38 it may still have a constructive effect on the interpretation of 
the already existing international agreements and negotiations over future agree-
ments.39 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2006/515/CE) [2006] OJ L201/15.
34.  Lucia Bellucci, “Cinema e diritto nell’integrazione europea: incentivazione economica e pro-
mozione della diversità culturale”, (2010) 3 Sociologia del diritto 89.
35. Art 1 letter h), Art 5 para 1 and Art 6 para 2 letter c). 
36. See, in particular, Art 1 letters a) and h), Art 2 para 2, Art 5 para 1 and Art 6 letters a) and b). 
37. Art 6 para 2 letter h).
38. Lucia Bellucci, Media, diritto e diversità culturale nell’Unione europea tra mito e realtà, Pisa, 
ETS, 2012, pp.19-22; Lucia Bellucci & Roberto Soprano, The WTO System and the Imple-
mentation of the UNESCO Convention: Two Case Studies, in Germann Avocats (Geneva) and 
multidisciplinary research team, Implementing the UNESCO Convention of 2005 in the European 
Union, Full Version of the Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate Gen-
eral for Internal Policies. Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies. Culture and 
Education, Bruxelles, European Parliament, 2010, at pages 162-163, available at: <www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/438587/IPOL-CULT_ET(2010) 438587_EN.pdf> 
and <www.diversitystudy.eu/ms/ep_study_long_version_20_nov_2010_final.pdf> (accessed 
October 12th, 2015) 
39. Rachael Craufurd Smith, “The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Building a New World Information and Communication Or-
der”, (2007) 1 International Journal of Communication 24, 48; L. Bellucci, préc., note 38, at pages 
20-21; L. Bellucci & R. Soprano, préc., note 38, p. 164. 
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3. Cultural Diversity and EU Relations with China: the 
China-Publications and AV Products case
Although the EU is party to the UNESCO Convention, its external relations take 
shape within a complex political and legal framework that involves the balancing of 
competing interests, which affects its role in protecting and promoting cultural di-
versity. An analysis of the 2009 China-Publications and AV Products case about non-
trade concerns, which was settled by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),40 
supports this supposition while providing greater depth of understanding about the 
complex nature of cultural diversity and its promotion, monitoring, and protection 
in a broader international context. 
In this case, the US filed a complaint related to a number of Chinese rules regula-
ting activities concerning the importation and distribution of reading materials, au-
diovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and films for theatrical 
release. According to the US, certain measures violated trading-rights commitments 
undertaken by China in the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China to the WTO as well as the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China to the WTO. The US claimed that these measures limited trading rights to 
Chinese state-owned companies, thus restricting the right of companies in China 
and of foreign companies and individuals to import products into China. They also 
argued that a number of measures were inconsistent with Article XVI GATS and/or 
Article XVII GATS as well as with Article III.4 of GATT 1994.
In its defence, China underlined the unique nature of cultural goods and services 
by referring to the UNESCO Convention and to the UNESCO Universal Declara-
tion on Cultural Diversity (hereinafter: the “UNESCO Declaration”).41 China argued 
that cultural goods and services go beyond commercial aims. They are “vectors of 
identity, values and meaning” (Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration; see also Arti-
cle 1(g) of the UNESCO Convention) and play a crucial role in “the evolution and 
definition of [...] societal features, values, ways of leaving together, ethics and be-
haviours.”42 China also referred to the UNESCO Declaration because it was adopted 
by all UNESCO Members, including the US. In contrast, however, while China is a 
party to the UNESCO Convention, the US is not. The US had returned to UNESCO 
40. On this case see also Tania Voon, “China − Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products”, (2009) 104-4 Amer-
ican Journal of International Law 710. 
41. On 2 November 2001 the 31st session of the UNESCO General Conference adopted the Decla-
ration on cultural diversity (UNESCO Declaration), which was accompanied by an Action Plan. 
This declaration recognizes cultural diversity as a common heritage of humanity as well as the 
peculiarity of cultural goods and services as compared to other goods. See Arts 1 and 8.  
42. WTO, Panel Report, China − Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Cer-
tain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, préc. note 6, paras 4.276 and 7.751. 
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as a Member in 2003 after a long period of absence43, and it had participated in the 
UNESCO Convention negotiations, but it was one of two countries that opposed 
this convention and never became a Party to it. Therefore, the UNESCO Conven-
tion is not binding for the US,44 a country which articulated some consternation at 
the convention’s potential “to be misinterpreted in ways that might impede the free 
flow of ideas and affect areas like trade, justifying protectionism.”45 
China made the connection between cultural goods and the protection of public 
morals, arguing that it was in its interest to protect public morals through an appro-
priate content-review mechanism that prohibited any cultural goods with content46 
that could have a negative impact on such morals. As underlined in the UNESCO 
Convention, cultural goods have a major influence on societal and individual mo-
rals. Therefore, the regulations in question were necessary to protect public morals, 
and totally justified under Article XX(a) of the GATT and its chapeau.47
The EU (then EC) supported the US complaint,48 taking the opportunity to un-
derline its position on services.49 Nevertheless, in contrast to other third Parties, 
it referred neither to the UNESCO Convention nor to the UNESCO Declaration. 
The EU did not make statements in support of cultural diversity, even though they 
would have reinforced the effectiveness of its position on services and strengthened 
the role of the UNESCO Convention “in the interpretation of existing international 
agreements and negotiations over their future development.”50 
The EU position in this case is arguably inconsistent with the support of cultural 
diversity expressed within the WTO negotiations and its role of party to the UNES-
43. See for details C. Edwin Baker, Media, Markets, and Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002, pp. 271-274. 
44. Cf Art 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
45. L. Bellucci & R. Soprano, prec., note 38, p. 159.
46. These contents ranged from violence or pornography to the protection of Chinese culture and 
traditional values.
47. WTO Panel Report, China − Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, supra note 6, paras 4.109 ff, 4.276 
ff, 7.714 and 7.753. The chapeau of Art XX is its introductory clause and it indicates the general 
requirements that the measure must meet in order to comply with it. On this paragraph cf also 
L. Bellucci & R. Soprano, préc., note 38, p. 159.
48. China − Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications 
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (WT/DS363). First submission of the United States 
of America, 13 May 2008, available at: <www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Mon-
itoring_ Enforcement/Dispute_ Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_
file221_14895.pdf> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
49. DS363 China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publi-
cations and Audiovisual Entertainment Products. Third Party Written Submission by the Euro-
pean Communities, 4 July 2008, 16 ff, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/
august/tradoc_ 140292.pdf> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
50. L. Bellucci & R. Soprano, prec., note 38, p.165.
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CO Convention. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the Commission’s position ex-
pressed in the Communication of 2006 concerning the EU-China partnership.51 In 
this particular communication, the EU opposes barriers to market access52, and the-
refore discrimination against foreign cultural goods, supporting the development of 
trade relations.53 It also encourages “full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms 
in all regions of China.”54 
The EU’s policy with regard to China hinges on the idea that cultural diversity 
cannot become a justification for a lack of respect of human rights. The relationship 
between the protection of cultural diversity and the respect of the rights in question 
is a very complex one which will be explored more in depth in Section six. 
4. EU-Canada Relations and CETA 
Given the general lack of success within the WTO’s multilateral context, com-
mercial partners turned to bilateral agreements: the FTAs. As previously explained, 
the mechanism used in these agreements is straightforward. Through the so-called 
“negative list approach” these negotiations require states to establish a definitive 
list of restrictions rather than enabling them to make gradual, liberalizing commit-
ments. For CETA, the negotiations on cultural issues have been among the most 
controversial. CETA is broader in scope and ambition than NAFTA, and it is expec-
ted to come into effect in 2016 if approved by the Council and Parliament. 
Canada and the EU are commercial partners that share very similar views on 
cultural diversity in international trade, thus diverging notably from the US. Never-
theless, their positions on the matter are different. The EU has never, for example, 
advocated the concept of “cultural exception” and has, historically, limited the ex-
clusion of cultural sectors from trade agreements to audiovisual services. Canada 
has instead supported the notion of “cultural exception,” considering it as a value 
51. Cf Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: EU - 
China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities (24 October 2006) COM (2006) 631 final. On 
the relations between the EU and China and cultural diversity, see Delia Ferri, An Investigation 
on the (Desirable) Role of Cultural Diversity in the EU-China Partnership in F. Snyder (ed), Eu-
rope, India and China: Strategic Partners in a Changing World. L’Europe, l’Inde et la Chine: parte-
naires stratégiques dans un monde en mutation, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2008. 
52. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: EU - Chi-
na: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, préc., note 51, para 3.3.
53. On trade relations between the EU and China see Denise Prevost et al, EU-China Trade Rela-
tions, Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Pol-
icies of the Union, Directorate B. Policy Department, Bruxelles: European Parliament, 2011, 
available at: <www.europarl .europa.eu/committees/en/inta/studiesdownload.html?languageD-
ocument=IT&file=48598> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
54. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: EU - Chi-
na: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, préc., note 51, para 3.1.
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extending to all cultural industries and applying it to all chapters of trade agree-
ments.
A consolidated CETA text was made public on 26 September 201455 only for 
informational purposes; it will be subject to legal revision and then transmitted to 
the Council and Parliament for ratification. It will only become binding under inter-
national law after the ratification process will be completed. I will therefore refrain 
from citing specific article numbers because they may be subject to change after the 
legal review. 
The text of the CETA document reveals that both the EU and Canada have pre-
served part of their tradition in terms of defining the notion of cultural diversity, 
but they have also introduced innovative elements concerning the scope of its ap-
plication. On the one hand, this agreement refers only to audiovisual services with 
regard to the EU, but with regard to Canada, which has embraced a broad defini-
tion of cultural industries since NAFTA,56 it employs a broader concept of cultural 
industries,57 including a wide range of cultural sectors and activities. On the other 
hand, CETA has adopted an approach of “targeted” exemption; that is, an exemp-
tion “chapter by chapter.”58 This has introduced an exemption in the chapters where 
the Parties have cultural policies and measures supporting culture that they wish to 
protect. 
This agreement is inspired by NAFTA’s “negative list approach” that the EU has 
never adopted before now. For CETA, the EU abandoned the “positive list approach” 
which has always characterized its external trade relations. 
In the Chapter on Exceptions, for example, the Parties “recall the exceptions ap-
plicable to culture as set out in the relevant provisions of Chapters on Cross-Border 
Trade in Services, Domestic Regulation, Government Procurement, Investment, 
Subsidies [...],” thus summarizing the chapters of the agreement that are mostly 
concerned with the present analysis. Within its Chapter on Subsidies, CETA states 
55. Available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf> (ac-
cessed October 12th, 2015) 
56. For the definition see Art 2107, letters a)-e) NAFTA.
57. In the Chapter on Exceptions, CETA defines cultural industries by reference to “a person en-
gaged in: (a) the publication, distribution or sale of books, magazines, periodicals or newspapers 
in print or machine-readable form, except when printing or typesetting any of the foregoing is 
the only activity; (b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings; 
the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music recordings; the publica-
tion, distribution or sale of music in print or machine-readable form; or radiocommunications 
in which the transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, 
television and cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcast net-
work services.” Letters following b) seem to actually be missing in this version of CETA.
58. Charles Vallerand, “Exemption culturelle - Trouver un accord avec les Européens” Le De-
voir, March 30th, 2013, available at: <www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-internatio-
nales/374574/trouver-un-accord-avec-les-europeens> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
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that nothing “in this Agreement applies to subsidies or government support with 
respect to audio-visual services for the EU and to cultural industries for Canada.” 
This article in particular concerns the internationally controversial issue of public 
support to culture, including state aid to film production.59 In the Chapter on In-
vestment, the agreement states the following: “For the EU, the Section on Establish-
ment of Investments and Section on Non-Discriminatory Treatment do not apply 
to measures with respect to Audio-visual services. For Canada, the Section on Es-
tablishment of Investments and Section on Non-Discriminatory Treatment do not 
apply to measures with respect to cultural industries.” The Chapter on Cross-Border 
Trade in Services excludes from its scope of application measures affecting, for the 
EU, audiovisual services, and, for Canada, cultural industries. CETA also states that 
the chapter on domestic regulation “does not apply to licensing requirements and 
procedures and to qualification requirements and procedures [...] relating [...for] 
Canada [to...] cultural industries [and for] the European Union [to...] audio-visual 
services.” Even with regard to government procurement, the agreement takes into 
consideration issues related to the protection and promotion of cultural diversity.
Pierre Marc Johnson, Québec’s negotiator for CETA, has argued that the UNES-
CO Convention inspired the negotiations of this agreement.60 For the first time, 
using an innovative approach, a bilateral trade agreement has made reference to this 
convention. Recognizing in the CETA’s preamble that the provisions of this agree-
ment “preserve the right to regulate within their territories and resolving to pre-
serve their flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public health, 
safety, environment, public morals and the promotion and protection of cultural di-
versity, [the EU and Canada affirm] their commitments as Parties to the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions. [They recognize] that states have the right to preserve, develop and imple-
ment their cultural policies, and to support their cultural industries for the purpose 
of strengthening the diversity of cultural expressions, and preserving their cultural 
identity, including through the use of regulatory measures and financial support.”
As already mentioned in Section 3, the EU is the only regional economic orga-
nisation to be party to the UNESCO Convention. As for Canada, it was among the 
most engaged promoters of the Convention, both at level of the institutions and 
NGOs. Canada was also the very first country to become a party to it. Its national 
Coalition for Cultural Diversity (CCD) played an important role in the adoption of 
the UNESCO Convention.
59. This issue has been a source of conflict not only internationally but even within the EU. For de-
tails on this topic see L. Bellucci, prec., note 2, at pages 211-212.
60. Information obtained from Pierre Marc Johnson during the conference, “L’AECG et le juriste 
canadien et québécois” (Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal, 30 March 2012) as part of the 
answer to my question on CETA’s approach to culture and, more particularly, the audiovisual 
sector.
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5. The Notion of “Protectionism”, the TTIP and Other 
Challenges with regard to Cultural Diversity 
As can be concluded from the previous Section, the CETA makes frequent use 
of the term “preserve.” This term is linked to the concept of protection and, by as-
sociation, to protectionism, which the Oxford Dictionary defines as: “The theory or 
practice of shielding a country’s domestic industries from foreign competition by 
taxing imports.” 
While this paper is not the forum to explore this concept from an economic 
standpoint, in terms of protectionism and cultural diversity, it is useful to bear in 
mind the distinction made by C. Edwin Baker between weak protectionism and 
strong protectionism. Baker draws from the earlier reflections of Oliver Goode-
nough,61 who, however, provides a different scope of application of these categories. 
Essentially, Baker concludes that non-supporters of trade restraints “typically invoke 
[…] a ‘museum’, ‘commodity’ or ‘artifact’ conception of culture. [They conceive it as] 
relatively static, largely backward62 looking and very much content-oriented.”63 Sup-
porters of these restraints instead have a “‘discourse’ or ‘dialogic’ conception of cul-
ture.” [This view] makes participants, rather than content, central to culture [since 
in] discourse, it matters who the speaker and who the audience are […].64 Non-sup-
porters disallow forms of weak protectionism, while supporters deem them justifi-
able. According to the latter, the protection of culture aims at assuring that members 
of cultural communities have relevant chances to be cultural speakers. According to 
Baker: “Culture as dialogue emphasizes both a past as context and a present as an 
arena for affirming, critiquing and transforming individual and collective identity. 
[...] Its goal is to maintain (or create) a dynamic local cultural discourse.”65 It could 
therefore be surmised that weak protectionism facilitates cultural pluralism, guar-
anteeing a wide cultural offering even in an oligopoly market. Prime examples are 
the quotas and state aid introduced by EU Member States in support of the Europe-
an audiovisual production, justified by the influence of the powerful oligopolies of 
the Hollywood entertainment industry on the global film market. 
As already mentioned, in all of its negotiations with the WTO, the EU has de-
fended the support of audiovisual services through government-funded incentives 
such as state aid. During its negotiations, the US, instead, pushed hard for the lib-
61. Oliver Goodenough, “Defending the Imaginary to Death? Free Trade, National Identity and 
Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation”, (1988) 15 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 203.
62. Italics appear in Baker’s text.
63. C. Baker, préc., note 43, pp. 249-250.
64. Id., pp. 250-251.
65. C. Baker, prec., note 43, at pages,  p. 251.
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eralization of these services, thereby denying the possibility of this kind of support. 
From this point of view, in cultural terms, the TTIP is an extremely delicate agree-
ment. Negotiations between Canada and the EU on issues pertaining to the protec-
tion and the promotion of cultural diversity were particularly complex due to the 
partially differing views of the two parties, as stated before, but it is easy to imagine 
that the TTIP negotiations on the matter will be even more complex.      
The power of the US cultural industries and, therefore, the position historically 
held by the US during international trade negotiations justify the fears of those who 
maintain that the TTIP could weaken the instruments put in place in Europe to 
protect the audiovisual industry. Nevertheless, and not hiding the fact that “the US 
has a strong interest in gaining access to markets for services related to films and tele-
vision,”66 the Commission has excluded that the EU position on cultural diversity will 
change during TTIP negotiations. It has reassured that promoting “cultural diversity 
will remain a guiding principle for TTIP, just as it has been in other EU trade agree-
ments.”67 The extent of the implementation of this notion in the TTIP will hinge 
greatly on the EU’s negotiation power and the unity of its Member States, unity 
which, as we know, has never been a given and which risks being undermined even 
more in these times of economic crisis and limited cohesion among the Member 
States. Another crucial factor will be the long-run tendency of the EU and many of 
its Member States to adopt, irrespective of proclamations on the welfare state and 
equal access to services, neoliberal policies that have impacted sectors, including 
the health, education and cultural sectors, that in many Member States have histor-
ically relied heavily on public funding.     
Returning to Baker’s distinction, strong protectionism limits cultural offer-
ings and the possibility for consumers/users to choose, thereby hindering cultural 
pluralism and freedom of expression. In summary, weak protectionism promotes 
choices, while strong protectionism has an exclusionary aim.68 Baker deems that the 
discriminant between the two forms of protectionism lies in the respect of human 
rights. Because it fails to protect such rights, strong protectionism is, according to 
Baker, unacceptable. For him, fundamental rights are the least common denomina-
tor, the discriminant between the kind of protectionism that is acceptable and the 
kind that is not. In this sense, the 2009 China-Publications and AV Products case 
could be (and has been) considered an example of a limitation of cultural offering 
and, therefore, as the exemplification of a kind of protectionism that strongly limits 
Chinese citizens’ exposure to forms of cultural expressions different to those offered 
by the Chinese public cultural industry. 
66. European Commission, TTIP and Culture, at : <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/
july/tradoc_152670.pdf> (accessed October 12th, 2015) 
67. Id. p. 6.
68. C. Baker, prec., note 43, p. 267.
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On the other hand, however, it is true that, historically, in countries where cer-
tain industrial sectors were still under development, forms of protectionism were 
often used in an effort to limit foreign competition and nationalise the industry 
until it was sufficiently developed. Post-war Italy, for instance, achieved growth in 
part thanks to state-run industries considered strategic for the country’s industrial 
and cultural development, from the hydrocarbon industry to the television indus-
try. These forms of protection lead to the concentration of power and corruption, 
and make it very difficult for the future development of competitivity, a key factor 
in driving innovation and productivity. Nevertheless, in the short term, this strategy 
enables a level of growth not otherwise possible. 
The 2001 Communication on audiovisual services presented during the Doha 
Round by Brazil,69 a country politically and economically very different from China, 
brought attention to the need for developing countries to find a balance between lib-
eralization and protection in order to gain economic advantages in trade exchanges 
and defend their cultural diversity. This, especially considering that the oligopolies 
of “Western” countries can afford to place audiovisual products at “dumping” lev-
els in foreign markets, since they can recoup their costs in their home market, is a 
practice which creates unfair competition. The products are sold cheaply until what 
I would venture to call a “cultural addiction”, and therefore a market, is created. The 
prices are then raised when the cultural addiction is consolidated. One can there-
fore argue that, considering the situation of unfair competition, the least common 
denominator of human rights is only in appearance an easy tool by which to distin-
guish between what is acceptable and what is not. 
The EU and others must come to terms with the complex scenarios of countries 
that have differing needs and priorities rooted in different socio-economic, political 
and cultural landscapes. In order to maintain a constructive dialogue with countries 
that are still in the process of developing their cultural industries, it will therefore be 
necessary to learn to adopt non-Western centered points of view in terms of inter-
national trade and cultural diversity.  
From the standpoint of China, the need to strengthen an industry that is not 
yet internationally competitive so that it may become increasingly open should be 
considered a crucial one. China is a transition economy and, in less than a decade, 
the development of cultural industries, for example the film industry, has undoubt-
edly accelerated. However, it is undeniable that, by acceding to the WTO, China has 
taken commitments that it cannot violate. Therefore, WTO membership may help 
transform China, because, as Liying Zhang and Xiaoyu Hu observe, it seems quite 
69. S/CSS/W/99 of 9 July 2011. For details on this communication, see Christoph Beat Graber, 
Audio-visual policy: the stumbling block of trade liberalization, in Damien Geradin and Da-
vid Luff, The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 167-169.
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difficult for the Chinese government to comply with WTO rules and, at the same 
time, maintain its control over cultural diversity intact.70  
CONCLUSION
During the Uruguay Round, the Commission privileged the idea of “cultural 
specificity,” according to which audiovisual services should be included in the scope 
of GATS, but also be subject to a specific legal regime.71 During the Doha Round, 
the Commission chose to adopt an analogous but different notion of “cultural diver-
sity.” It acknowledged an idea of cultural promotion rather than of cultural defence 
and searched for a concept that could accommodate all Member States’ traditions 
of cultural policy. 
In contrast to France and Canada, the EU has never embraced the notion of 
cultural exception, which implies a general exemption concerning cultural sectors. 
Furthermore, it has focused only on the audiovisual sector, rather than on cultural 
industries more broadly. 
Within the framework of WTO negotiations, the EU adopted the “positive list 
approach.” As part of CETA, it has kept its traditional focus on audiovisual services 
but abandoned the above-mentioned approach in favour of a “chapter by chapter” 
exemption,72 which introduced cultural exemptions in chapters where Parties have 
cultural policies and measures in favour of culture that they wish to protect. This 
approach has been criticized because it could potentially lead to stronger liberali-
zation in areas that are culturally sensitive; and yet, it has been welcomed by some 
because it allows for clearer protection of relevant cultural sectors while excluding 
areas like intellectual property. Supporters of this approach have underlined that it 
could be used in the negotiations with states, in particular the US, whose position 
on the liberalization of cultural sectors is distant from EU and Canadian positions.73 
In this sense, CETA has been considered a training field for even more complex bi-
lateral negotiations.74 Supporters have also highlighted that CETA is the first trade 
agreement that mentions the UNESCO Convention in its Preamble.
70. Liying Zhang and Xiaoyu Hu, “Liberalization of Trade and Domestic Control on Cultural Prod-
ucts. The Application of Public Morals Exception in China – Audiovisual Services”, (2011) 45:3 
Revue juridique Thémis 405, 428.
71. A. Herold, prec. note 15, at 6.
72. C. Vallerand, prec., note 58. 
73. Id. 
74. During a telephone interview given to the Québec daily newspaper Le Devoir, Pierre Marc John-
son underlined the fact that CETA could provide an opportunity for Canada and the EU to 
develop more effective legal terms and means to be used in view of future negotiations, such 
as those with the US or Japan, whose positions are much more distant from those of Canada 
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Even though the protection exerted by the EU is traditionally limited to the au-
diovisual sector and was never conceived as a general exemption, it is evident that 
the EU is one of the socio-economic actors that have most strongly supported cul-
tural diversity in international trade. The EU has fostered a promotional law75 in 
culturally-sensitive, socio-economic areas. Its Member States spoke with a common 
voice in relation to the notion of cultural diversity, thus finding a shared concept in 
order to prevent liberalization in the audiovisual sector, despite different cultural 
policies and economic interests. 
At the international level, the notion of “cultural diversity” was recognized by 
a legally-binding text: the UNESCO Convention. The EU reaffirmed its position 
on cultural diversity through its accession to this convention. Nevertheless, as it 
emerged from the 2009 China-Publications and AV Products case, its support for the 
UNESCO Convention is potentially limited by a complex set of interests that shape 
EU external relations. In this case, the interests involved pertain to the development 
of trade relations, which excludes barriers to market access and discrimination of 
foreign cultural goods, and the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in Chi-
na. 
Future trade negotiations, in particular those of the TTIP with the US, will show 
whether EU Member States will converge toward the notion of cultural diversity 
as they have in the past, despite their different traditions of cultural policies, or 
abandon it altogether. This convergence may be undermined in particular by the 
economic crisis affecting most EU Member States – which may induce those that 
are usually inclined to protect local cultural industries to support liberalization in 
exchange of commercial benefits, thus reproducing the scheme that can be observed 
in other FTAs – and by the neoliberal tendencies of the policies of the EU and its 
Member States, even the ones that consider major public funding essential to cer-
tain services.76 These negotiations will demonstrate whether or not the “targeted” 
exemption adopted by CETA will be a passe-partout for liberalizing markets that 
have been hitherto protected, or, if they will become an effective tool to support 
cultural diversity. 
The possible interpretations of the notion of protectionism multiply if the notion 
is analyzed from a non-Western perspective, in other words from the viewpoint of 
the countries that have yet to develop their cultural industries in the hope of pro-
moting their cultural diversity. From this vantage point, equilibriums and challeng-
es emerge that are different to the ones found if our scope of analysis were limited 
de renforcer la diversité culturelle” (October 18th, 2012), available at: <http://cdc-ccd.org/Libre-
echange-Canada-UE-L-occasion?lang=fr> (accessed October 12th, 2015)
75. On the literature of promotional law and positive sanction, see the first chapter of my book, Cin-
ema e aiuti di Stato nell’integrazione europea. Un diritto promozionale in Italia e in Francia, supra 
nota 12.
76. See, for example, the US-Korea FTA (KORUS FTA).
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to “Western” countries, whose policies are shaped by markedly different socio-eco-
nomic, political and cultural scenarios. Finally, it behooves me to recall the very en-
riching conversation I recently had with a colleague and friend whom I hold in very 
high esteem who concluded that cultural diversity is not identified in an abstract 
concept, but in a people. 
